Xi'an Incident

For the 1981 film based on the incident, see The Xi'an Incident (film).

Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng, and Chiang Kai-shek two months before the incident

Xi'an Incident
Traditional Chinese	西安事變
Simplified Chinese	西安事变
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Xī'ān Shìbiàn Wade–Giles Hsi-an Shih-pian

The Xi'an Incident was a major Chinese political crisis from 12 to 26 December 1936. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist government of China, was placed under house arrest in the city of Xi'an by a Nationalist army he was there to review. Chiang's captors hoped to end the Chinese Civil War and confront Japanese imperial expansion into Chinese territory. After two weeks of intense negotiations between Chiang, his captors, representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and significant external pressure from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, the two parties agreed to pursue a strategy of cooperation against future Japanese aggression.

Before the incident, Chiang Kai-shek had followed a public strategy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" that entailed eliminating the CCP before confronting Japanese aggression. This strategy was deeply unpopular among many groups in China, including the Northeastern Army tasked with suppressing the main Communist base in Yan'an. The Northeastern Army was mainly composed of troops exiled from Manchuria after that region was invaded by Japan in 1931. Northeastern Army soldiers and officers had also begun to fraternize with the Communists and were convinced of the need for a united Nationalist-Communist front against Japan.

Recent research has uncovered a new perspective into the crisis. In the months leading up to the Xi'an Incident, Chiang had secretly initiated negotiations with both the CCP and the Soviet Union. In these secret dealings, the groundwork for the future United Front was laid in preparation for future Japanese aggression. These agreements were conducted through the course of 1936 and finalized by early December, although not in writing.

Unaware of these developments, the commanders of the Northeastern Army, generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, hatched an independent conspiracy to kidnap Chiang. Zhang invited Chiang to come review the Northeastern Army, and after Chiang arrived, had him placed under house arrest at the Huaqing Pool complex.

Zhang Xueliang, Soong Mei-ling, and Chiang Kai-Shek in October, seven weeks before the incident

Some radical Communists, Mao Zedong chief among them, wanted Chiang executed immediately. However, overwhelming opposition from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin pressured the CCP against the move, as the Soviets valued Chiang's leadership as a critical asset against the Japanese threat to their eastern borders. In accordance with Moscow's instructions, the CCP used their influence to safeguard Chiang instead. Combined with the mobilization of an expeditionary force by He Yingqin to attack Xi'an, the Communists and Zhang Xueling were pressured into creating a United Front under Chiang's leadership.

Zhou Enlai led the Communist negotiating team, which after two weeks finalized the secret agreement made earlier in the year. The rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists outraged the Japanese, and eventually helped lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War. The full-scale Japanese invasion hastened the formal joining of the two Chinese factions in the Second United Front.

Background

Further information: Chinese Civil War

Gradual changes in policy

Map showing the situation of China during the Xi'an Incident in December 1936

Japan's invasion of Manchuria posed an obvious threat to the Chinese Communists, and from the beginning they organized guerillas to resist the Japanese occupation in Manchuria. The CCP's policy was equally opposed to the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek, summarized by the slogan "Resisting Japan and Opposing Chiang". The USSR was also concerned by Japanese expansionism and by Adolf Hitler's rise to power in Germany. They restored diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government in 1932, and even proposed a non-aggression treaty in 1933. The CCP delegation to the 7th World Congress of the Comintern, headed by Wang Ming, published the "1 August Declaration", which for the first time called for a united front of all parties in China opposed to Japanese imperialism, including the KMT. They proposed creating a anti-Japanese defense government to coordinate resistance. Importantly, though, the offer did not extend to Chiang himself; the CCP's delegation still considered him and his central government the "running dog" of the Japanese.

When the full details of the Long March and the CCP's devastating defeats in south China reached Moscow, the pressure to find an end to the civil war mounted. Wang Ming even published a series of articles where he called for Chiang to either join an anti-Japanese united front or be overthrown by KMT patriots. The CCP itself had been cut off from radio communication with Moscow at the start of the Long March, and they did not learn of the Comintern's call for a united front until November 1935. The message they received was still to "Resist Japan and Oppose Chiang". In December, party leaders held a conference at Wayaobao. Their Wayaobu Manifesto echoed Wang Ming's 1 August Declaration. It called for "the most broad national united front" to resist Japan, and announced that they would suspend class conflict in the interests of cross-class collaboration. However, it also made clear that the CCP did not want to give up its military strength. As a basis from which to resist the Japanese, the Manifesto called for the Red Army to be expanded to 1 million men and for the Chinese Soviet to dramatically increase its land area.

Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek was reconsidering his policy as well. He had justified his focus on the civil war and appeasement towards Japan based on a policy called "first internal pacification, then external resistance." This strategy was increasingly viewed as non-resistance to Japan. On December 9, 1936, for example, a major student protest broke out in Beiping. Chiang also faced Relations between Tokyo and Nanjing worsened over events in North China, and negotiations had reached an apparent impasse by October. China reached out to Nazi Germany to help mediate, but afraid of offending Japan, the Germans declined to get involved. War appeared to be imminent. Chiang wanted the material and diplomatic support of the Soviet Union, and decided that the CCP was no longer enough of a threat to prevent negotiations.

Early attempts at negotiations

Zhou Enlai in the 1930s, who would represent the CCP at the negotiations.

In January 1936, Chiang Kai-shek sent emissaries to Moscow to negotiate a military mutual assistance treaty. As a precondition for a treaty, Chiang wanted the Soviet Union to order the CCP to end its operations and submit to the Nationalist Government. The Soviet Ambassador told Chiang that while the USSR hoped the CCP would agree to a unified command under the Nationalists, Chiang would have to negotiate directly with the CCP. This upset Chiang, who worried that if the USSR was unwilling to order the CCP to stop, they might be willing to support further revolutionary actions by the CCP in the future. Progress halted, and after news leaked to the press that he was contemplating a treaty with the USSR, Chiang called off negotiations. These maneuvers left Stalin wary of Chiang's intentions.

Nevertheless, Chiang still sought contacts with the CCP inside China. Soong Ching-ling managed to recruit a Communist priest, Dong Jianwu, to cross the front lines and bring the CCP the message that Chiang was interested in ending the civil war. Dong arrived on February 27. The CCP Central Committee told him that the CCP would be interested in negotiating a ceasefire along the lines of the Wayaobao Manifesto (i.e., an alliance that excluded Chiang). Given the complete incompatibility of the CCP and KMT's conditions, serious negotiations did not take place during the first half of 1936.

Creation of an alliance between the CCP and Zhang Xueliang

Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng in 1936

The Nationalist forces besieging the Communists were composed of two armies: the Northeastern Army led by Zhang Xueliang and the Northwestern Army led by Yang Hucheng. Both Yang and Zhang were former warlords who had pledged their armies to the Nationalist Government. Zhang had governed Manchuria before it was overrun by the Japanese, and strongly wished to retake his homeland. He opposed the concessions that Chiang had made to Japan, and was frustrated by his orders to fight the Communists rather than the Japanese. Yang had likewise become skeptical of Chiang's anti-Japanese commitment after the public demonstrations in December 1935. Zhang and Yang had been promised an easy victory against the Communists. They were surprised and dismayed when the Red Army defeated them in several major engagements. The Red Army treated their POWs well and gave them a political education, sending them back to spread the word that the Communists wanted to form an anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese alliance. This effectively destroyed morale in the Nationalist armies, and the soldiers began pressing for a truce with the Communists. With his officer Nan Hanchen acting as intermediary, Yang Hucheng was able to conclude a ceasefire quickly. Negotiations with Zhang Xueliang took longer because there the CCP had no established contacts in the Northeastern Army. But after Dong Jianwu requested passage to CCP territory on a mission from the central government, Zhang realized that the central government was negotiating with the CCP and was encouraged to do so himself. A ceasefire was agreed on February 25.

The [CCP]'s call for suspending the civil war and forming a united anti-Japanese resistance touched not only my heart deeply but also the hearts of most of the men in the Northeastern Army.

Zhang Xueliang

On April 9, Zhang Xueliang met with Zhou Enlai. Zhou, an experienced negotiator, was able to solidify the ceasefire and secure supplies for the Red Army. In this and subsequent meetings, Zhang Xueliang would argue that resisting Japan would only be possible if the CCP gave up its opposition to Chiang. Zhou said that the CCP would discuss the point, but refused to commit to changing the policy. As negotiations between Zhang and the CCP continued, the Communists infiltrated the Northeastern Army. They spread communist ideas among the soldiers and recruited officers into secret societies. This support from within the army helped them to persuade Zhang to form an alliance. They planned to use Soviet support to take over Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang and turn northwest China into a base under Zhang's command to resist Japan and oppose Chiang.

Renewed negotiations

Over the course of the year, the Soviets had become more convinced that the united front should include Chiang. Wang Ming was reluctant to accept this idea. In March, when the Comintern abandoned the slogan "resist Japan and oppose Chiang", he suggested replacing it with "resist Japan and oppose the villain". In June, when the Liangguang Incident took place, Wang Ming supported the uprising against Chiang even after Pravda condemned it. In late June, the CCP re-established radio communications with Moscow. They transmitted the Wayaobao Manifesto and informed the Comintern of their alliance with Zhang. They asked for assistance in carrying out their plan to form an anti-Japan, anti-Chiang base. The Comintern responded with a telegram on August 15 admonishing the CCP for continuing to oppose Chiang. The Comintern did approve the other provisions of the Wayaobao Manifesto, agreeing that neither soviet power nor the independence of the Red Army should be sacrificed. But they absolutely vetoed the CCP's plan to form a base in the northwest, knowing that such a move would scuttle any chance for a united front with the KMT. The CCP accepted the new directive from the Comintern. They dropped the new slogan "compelling Chiang to resist Japan." They also sent messages to their contacts within the KMT explaining their change in policy and hoping to restart negotiations.

Unfortunately, at the same time that the CCP had become more open to negotiations, Chiang had lost some of his interest in the idea. He had brought the Liangguang Incident to a peaceful conclusion, and no longer felt a deal with the CCP to be as urgent. Chiang's conditions came as a surprise to both the CCP and the Comintern. He wanted to CCP to stop all revolutionary acitivites and have the Red Army submit completely to central authority, on the same terms as any other unit of the Nationalist Army. The CCP desperately needed supplies, and decided that they would have to agree to Chiang's demands, although on the condition that the leadership structure of the Red Army remain unchanged. The Comintern opposed making these concessions, however, and told the CCP to fight its way to the border to receive a large cache of Soviet supplies. In October 1936, the CCP launched the Ningxia campaign in order to make its way to the border and receive supplies. The operation was beset by difficulties, and by November the situation was untenable. They then received a new message from Chiang setting even harsher conditions for a ceasefire. The CCP decided to try to break out of the siege to the south and west.

This created a serious problem for Zhang Xueliang. If the CCP broke the siege and moved inland, it would deprive him of what he considered his best chance to begin a campaign against Japan. He flew to Louyang in an urgent attempt to convince Chiang Kai-shek to agree to a peace with the Communists. This failed. Upon returning to Xi'an, he and Yang Hucheng plotted to kidnap Chiang Kai-shek when he arrived in the city to review the troops.

Events

Chiang's arrest

Bullet hole made while Northeastern Army soldiers stormed the Huaqing Pool complex

In November 1936, Zhang asked Chiang to come to Xi'an to raise the morale of troops unwilling to fight the Communists. Despite warnings from close friends like H. H. Kung of the dangers of the trip, Chiang chose to proceed, partly because his previous ventures into the territory of his adversaries had earned him a reputation for "fearlessness."

After Chiang agreed, Zhang informed Mao Zedong, who called the plan "a masterpiece". At Xi'an, Chiang stayed in his resort headquarters at the Huaqing Pool complex in Lintong, ten miles outside Xi'an.

On 12 December 1936, bodyguards of Zhang and Yang stormed the cabin where Chiang was sleeping. Chiang was able to escape but suffered an injury in the process. He was eventually detained by Zhang's troops in the morning. Chiang was then driven to a government office.

Immediate developments and reactions across China

The Northeastern Army sent a telegram to Nanjing explaining to the Chinese public why they had arrested Chiang and the eight demands they had for his release. These included an immediate end to civil war against the CCP, expulsion of pro-Japanese factions from the Nationalist government, and the adoption of an active anti-Japanese military stance. They attempted to broadcast these demands publicly, but Nationalist censorship prevented their publication outside the Communist-held areas.

In the 1930s, Wang Jingwei was a prominent leader in the Kuomintang. He was both a political partner and rival of Chiang, as well as his potential successor.

News of the abduction spawned a wave of "extraordinarily widespread" popular support for Chiang Kai-Shek, according to an American diplomat. This was paralleled by a surge of reproach directed at Zhang Xueliang by both the Nationalist government and the wider Chinese public, who viewed Zhang's actions as treachery.

The Military Affairs Commission, led by He Yingqin, threatened to launch a direct attack on Xi'an to rescue Chiang, and immediately sent a regiment to capture the pass in Tongguan. American journalist James Bertram recalled feeling how another civil war was about to break out, and personally observed fleets of government aircraft flying low over the roofs of Xi'an. H.H. Kung declared over radio that there would be "no dealings with armed rebellion, no truce with the 'Communist bandits.'" By mid-December, Nationalist aircraft were bombing the railway line through the Shaanxi mountains, accompanied by a spearhead of several elite divisions from the Central Army.

Chiang's wife Soong Mei-ling, fearing for her husband's life and a potential coup from He Yingqin, who had wired Chiang's rival Wang Jingwei in Italy asking him to return as soon as possible, vetoed the idea, and instead traveled to Xi'an to stay with Chiang during his captivity. Kong Xiangxi, along with Soong, was strongly in favor of negotiating a settlement to ensure the safety of Chiang.

Of key importance was the reaction of China's leaders. Many major figures, including warlord opponents of Chiang like Yan Xishan, were wary of a potential power vacuum that would follow Chiang's death or deposition. Chiang's ability to control the various factions of the Nationalist government was unique to his leadership and survival. Moreover, Chiang was implacably anti-Japanese, unlike his potential successor Wang Jingwei. This was a factor not lost on a key stakeholder in China, Joseph Stalin. News of Chiang's capture delighted Communist leader Mao Zedong, who wished Chiang executed immediately. Similarly, a faction of the Northeastern Army led by Yang Hucheng and the radical young officers of the "Anti-Japanese Comrade Society" wanted to execute Chiang. However, when Mao requested instructions from Moscow, he was met by a strong rebuke from Stalin, who found Chiang's imprisonment a serious source of alarm.

Stalin's intervention

Joseph Stalin in 1936, whose intervention likely saved Chiang's life

One key actor in the crisis was Joseph Stalin. Following the Chiang's abduction, a Chinese contact (Pan Hannian) had explained to Stalin that without Chiang, "China would be without a leader to fight the Japanese and this would not benefit the Soviet Union."

Stalin feared that in Chiang's absence, a figure like Wang Jingwei, perhaps assisted by He Yingqin (who had already contacted Wang in Italy after Chiang's arrest), would take control of the Nationalists and create a pro-Japanese Chinese regime, placing the Soviet Union in extreme danger of a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union. His anxieties were confirmed when Chiang's rival Wang Jingwei met with Adolf Hitler to discuss the prospect of China enlisting in the anti-Communist Axis in exchange for greater German aid to China.

Fearing a possible two-front war with both the Nazis and the Japanese, and potentially a pro-Japanese China in support, Stalin ordered that the CCP settle its disagreement with Chiang peacefully and release him alive. To this end, Zhou Enlai instructed Zhang Xueliang not to harm Chiang in any capacity.

Negotiations

In captivity, Zhang had offered Chiang a choice between death or a war with Japan in alliance with the Communists.

At first, Chiang refused to formally agree to any demands while held a captive, and appeared fully prepared to accept death rather than submission. This changed when Zhou Enlai, who Chiang had been in secret negotiations with since the summer of that year, arrived in Xi'an on December 16 to represent the CCP.

The negotiating room where Chiang Kai-shek met with Zhou Enlai

On December 24, Chiang received Zhou for a meeting, the first time the two had seen each other since Zhou had left Whampoa Military Academy over ten years earlier. Zhou began the conversation by saying: "In the ten years since we have met, you seem to have aged very little." Chiang nodded and said: "Enlai, you were my subordinate. You should do what I say." Zhou replied that if Chiang would halt the civil war and resist the Japanese instead, the Red Army would willingly accept Chiang's command.

In their meeting, Chiang and Zhou finalized the secret agreements that had been in tentative form since summer of 1936, where the Communists would accept orders from Chiang in a national unity coalition, and Chiang would allow the Communists to field their own independent army. To the public, it seemed as if Chiang had been compelled into an alliance against the Japanese, but in reality the terms of the arrangement were almost identical to those agreed upon in secret before the kidnapping took place.

At the end of the meeting, Chiang invited Zhou to Nanjing for further talks. Chiang was released on 26 December and returned to Nanjing with Zhang Xueliang.

Aftermath

Lin Sen receives Chiang Kai-shek at the Nanjing Airport after the Xi'an Incident.

When Chiang was released, public opinion was decisively in his favor. His arrival to Nanjing was greeted by cheering crowds of over 400,000 people. Edgar Snow declared that Chiang had returned with a national standing "higher than that of any leader in modern Chinese history."

Historian Jay Taylor writes how Xi'an turned Chiang from a "popular leader" into a "national hero." American ambassador Nelson T. Johnson wrote how "Whereas the outstanding developments during the first half of 1936 increased the precariousness of China's position, the significant events of the second half, in their larger aspects, have had the opposite effect." He observed that the Xi'an crisis "fostered another spontaneous outburst of nationalism throughout the country and caused universal rejoicing when the Generalissimo was released on Christmas Day."

The Second United Front

After Chiang returned to Nanjing, he announced a cease fire in the civil war. However, he also repudiated any promises that he had made in Xi'an. He had Zhang imprisoned and charged with treason. Chiang then sent 37 army divisions north to surround the Northeastern Army and force them to stand down. The army was deeply divided on the appropriate response. Yang Hucheng and the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society wanted to stand and fight if the KMT army attacked, and refuse to negotiate until Zhang was released. The Communist representatives strongly disagreed and cautioned that civil war would, in the words of Zhou Enlai, "make China into another Spain".

A Communist army order instructing its troops to accept orders from the Nationalist government

Further negotiations between the CCP and Nanjing continued. However, when a conference of Northeastern officers in January 1937 overwhelmingly resolved not to surrender peacefully, the CCP reluctantly decided that they could not abandon their allies and pledged to fight alongside them if the KMT attacked. The situation was again reversed when the five most senior Northeastern generals met separately and decided to surrender. The radical officers were enraged and assassinated one of the generals on 2 February, but this only turned the majority of the soldiers against the plan to stand and fight. The Northeastern Army peacefully surrendered to advancing KMT forces and was divided into new units, which were sent to Hebei, Hunan, and Anhui. Yang Hucheng, however, was arrested and eventually executed, while the leaders of the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society defected to the Red Army. Zhang was kept under house arrest for over 50 years before emigrating to Hawaii in 1993.

The rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists outraged the Japanese, and eventually helped lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War. This in turn hastened the two Chinese factions into formalizing their alliance as the Second United Front.

The Xi'an Incident was a turning point for the CCP. Chiang's leadership over political and military affairs in China was affirmed, while the CCP was able to expand its own strength under the new united front, which played a role in the Chinese Communist Revolution.

Legacy

In present day China, Zhang Xueliang is portrayed as a patriot who was shocked by Chiang's unwillingness to face the looming threat of Japan, rather focusing on fighting his fellow Chinese. In this narrative, Zhang kidnapped Chiang to force a change in attitude. Historian Rana Mitter, however, attributes Zhang's agenda to a more straightforward motivation: that Chiang was likely to deprive him of military command. To this end, Zhang's decision would have been influenced more out of self-preservation over patriotism.

See also

• Outline of the Chinese Civil War

References

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